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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
Cowen, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents the purely legal question of whether 
a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect 
regulations promulgated by federal administrative agencies 
pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d et seq. The district court 
determined that plaintiffs-appellants Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living ("CRCQL") could not maintain 
an action under a discriminatory effect regulation 
promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") pursuant to section 602 of Title VI. See 944 
F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996). In so doing, it relied largely 
on our decision in Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. 
Ctr., 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 
We find that Chowdhury is not dispositive on this issue. 
Subsequent jurisprudence, namely Guardians Ass'n v. Civil 
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), and 
its progeny, provides support for the existence of a private 
right of action. Moreover, Chowdhury did not apply this 
court's test for determining when it is appropriate to imply 
a private right of action to enforce regulations. We agree 
with the overwhelming number of courts of appeals that 
have indicated, with varying degrees of analysis, that a 
private right of action exists under section 602 of Title VI 
and its implementing regulations. We will reverse. 
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I. 
 
The non-profit corporation CRCQL brought suit against 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
("PADEP") and James M. Seif, in his capacity as Secretary 
of PADEP, and other related defendants. CRCQL alleges 
that PADEP's issuance of a permit to Soil Remediation 
Services, Inc., to operate a facility in the City of Chester, a 
predominantly black community, violated the civil rights of 
CRCQL's members.1 Specifically, the complaint asserts that 
PADEP's grant of the permit violated: (1) section 601 of Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d et seq.;2 
(2) the EPA's civil rights regulations, 40 C.F.R.S 7.10 et 
seq., promulgated pursuant to section 602 of Title VI;3 and 
(3) PADEP's assurance pursuant to the regulations that it 
would not violate the regulations. This appeal concerns only 
Count Two. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The City of Chester is located in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and 
has a population of approximately 42,000, of which 65% is black and 
32% is white. Delaware County, excluding Chester, has a population of 
approximately 502,000, of which 6.2% is black and 91% is white. 
CRCQL alleges that PADEP granted five waste facility permits for sites in 
the City of Chester since 1987, while only granting two permits for sites 
in the rest of Delaware County. It further alleges that the Chester 
facilities have a total permit capacity of 2.1 million tons of waste per 
year, while the non-Chester facilities have a total permit capacity of 
only 
1,400 tons of waste per year. 
 
2. Section 601 of Title VI provides, "No person in the United States 
shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance." 42 U.S.C. S 2000d (1994). 
 
3. Section 602 of Title VI provides, in part, that: 
 
        Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to 
       extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by 
       way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance 
or 
       guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions 
of 
       section 2000d of this title with respect to such program or 
activity 
       by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability 
which 
       shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the 
statute 
       authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the 
       action is taken. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1. 
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PADEP has authority to issue or deny applications for 
permits to operate waste processing facilities. See 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6018.101 et seq. (West 1993). PADEP 
receives federal funding from the EPA to operate 
Pennsylvania's waste programs pursuant to the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. S 6901 et seq., 
and other federal sources. 
 
Title VI and the EPA's civil rights regulations 
implementing Title VI condition PADEP's receipt of federal 
funding on its assurance that it will comply with Title VI 
and the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. S 7.80(a) (1997).4 In part, 
these regulations prohibit recipients of federal funding from 
using "criteria or methods . . . which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their 
race, color, national origin, or sex . . . ." 40 C.F.R. S 7.35(b). 
 
The district court dismissed Count One of CRCQL's 
complaint without prejudice. It found that CRCQL failed to 
allege intentional discrimination on the part of PADEP, 
which is a required element for an action brought under 
section 601 of Title VI.5 The court, however, granted leave 
to amend Count One, affording CRCQL the opportunity to 
allege intentional discrimination. CRCQL subsequently 
informed the district court that it would not amend the 
complaint, and the district court entered a final judgment 
on that count. 
 
The district court dismissed Counts Two and Three with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. This provision requires: 
 
       Applicants for EPA assistance shall submit an assurance with their 
       applications stating that, with respect to their programs or 
activities 
       that receive EPA assistance, they will comply with the requirements 
       of this Part. Applicants must also submit any other information 
that 
       the OCR determines is necessary for preaward review. The 
       applicant's acceptance of EPA assistance is an acceptance of the 
       obligation of this assurance and this Part. 
 
40 C.F.R. S 7.80(a)(1). 
 
5. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293, 105 S. Ct. 712, 716 
(1985) (clarifying that the Court's decision in Guardians established that 
"Title VI itself directly reache[s] only instances of intentional 
discrimination"). 
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prejudice, finding that no private right of action exists 
under which CRCQL could enforce the EPA's civil rights 
regulations.6 In reaching this determination, it relied on our 
statements in Chowdhury, which concerned whether a 
private plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies 
under section 602 of Title VI and its implementing 
regulations before bringing suit directly under section 601. 
In holding that a plaintiff need not do so, we reasoned in 
Chowdhury: 
 
       Congress explicitly provided for an administrative 
       enforcement mechanism, contained in section 602, by 
       which the funding agency attempts to secure voluntary 
       compliance and, failing that, is empowered to terminate 
       the violator's federal funding. Under the regulations 
       promulgated pursuant to this section, an aggrieved 
       individual may file a complaint with the funding agency 
       but has no role in the investigation or adjudication, if 
       any, of the complaint. The only remedies contemplated 
       by the language of the Act and the Regulations are 
       voluntary compliance and funding termination. There 
       is no provision for a remedy for the victim of the 
       discrimination, such as injunctive relief or damages. 
 
677 F.2d at 319-20 (footnotes omitted). The district court 
took these statements to signify that no private right of 
action exists under the EPA's civil rights regulations. 
Although the district court noted that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Guardians and the decisions of other courts of 
appeals provide support for implying a private right of 
action, it determined that Chowdhury required the opposite 
conclusion. See 944 F. Supp. at 417 n.5 ("We find that the 
Supreme Court has never decided the question of whether 
there is an implied right of action under the regulations 
and that our Court of Appeals's Chowdhury decision is 
authoritative on us."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. CRCQL only appeals the dismissal of Count Two. We have no occasion 
to consider the issue, raised by Count Three, of whether a private cause 
of action exists to enforce 40 C.F.R. S 7.80(a), which requires applicants 
for EPA assistance to "submit an assurance with their applications 
stating that, with respect to their programs or activities that receive 
EPA 
assistance, they will comply with the requirements of [the regulations]." 
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II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
district court's construction of Title VI and its conclusions 
of law. See In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 63 
(3d Cir. 1994); Unger v. Nat'l Residents Matching Program, 
928 F.2d 1392, 1394 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
III. 
 
It is important to distinguish at the outset between 
section 601 of Title VI, which was the basis of Count One 
of CRCQL's complaint, and section 602, which was the 
basis of Count Two. A private right of action exists under 
section 601, but this right only reaches instances of 
intentional discrimination as opposed to instances of 
discriminatory effect or disparate impact. See Alexander, 
469 U.S. at 293, 105 S. Ct. at 716 ("Title VI itself directly 
reache[s] only instances of intentional discrimination."). 
 
In contrast, section 602 merely authorizes agencies that 
distribute federal funds to promulgate regulations 
implementing section 601. The EPA promulgated such 
implementing regulations, which provide in relevant part: 
 
       A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of 
       administering its program which have the effect of 
       subjecting individuals to discrimination because of 
       their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the 
       effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
       accomplishment of the objectives of the program with 
       respect to individuals of a particular race, color, 
       national origin, or sex. 
 
40 C.F.R. S 7.35(b). This regulation clearly incorporates a 
discriminatory effect standard. The Supreme Court 
subsequently held that the promulgation of regulations 
incorporating this standard is a valid exercise of agency 
authority. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94, 105 S. Ct. at 
716. CRCQL seeks the right to proceed against PADEP 
under this standard, rather than the more stringent 
standard required under section 601. 
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A. 
 
We look first to the applicable Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. CRCQL contends that the Court's decisions 
in Guardians and Alexander establish a private right of 
action. Guardians is a fragmented decision consisting of five 
separate opinions. It concerned a suit by black and 
hispanic police officers alleging that certain lay-offs by their 
department violated Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 
U.S.C. SS 1981 and 1983, and other state and federal laws. 
The Supreme Court has now made it undeniably clear that 
Guardians stands for at least two propositions: (1) a private 
right of action exists under section 601 of Title VI that 
requires plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination; and 
(2) discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by 
agencies pursuant to section 602 are valid exercises of their 
authority under that section. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 
292-94, 105 S. Ct. at 716. 
 
i. 
 
Guardians did not explicitly address whether a private 
right of action exists under discriminatory effect regulations 
promulgated under section 602. CRCQL contends that 
Guardians nevertheless implicitly validated the existence of 
a private right of action. CRCQL makes two principal 
arguments in support of its position: (1) a majority of the 
Court in Guardians determined that private plaintiffs in 
disparate impact cases can recover injunctive or declarative 
relief; and (2) if a private right of action did not exist, the 
Court would have dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the 
regulations sua sponte for failure to state a claim. 
 
A close reading of the opinions in Guardians reveals that 
five Justices agreed that injunctive and declarative relief are 
available in discriminatory effect cases. For instance, 
Justice White stated in his opinion that he would allow 
private plaintiffs to proceed under section 601 with a 
discriminatory effect claim and to recover injunctive or 
declaratory relief. See 463 U.S. at 584, 589-93, 103 S. Ct. 
at 3223, 3226-28 (opinion of White, J.). Justice White did 
not comment on section 602 and its implementing 
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regulations. We can infer, however, from his willingness to 
allow a private plaintiff to proceed under section 601 in 
cases of discriminatory effect that he would have allowed 
private actions to proceed under section 602 and its 
implementing regulations, where a discriminatory effect 
standard applies.7 
 
Justice Marshall stated in his dissent that he would allow 
private plaintiffs in discriminatory effect cases to proceed 
under section 601 but, unlike Justice White, would allow 
them to recover injunctive, declaratory, or compensatory 
relief. See 463 U.S. at 615, 103 S. Ct. at 3239-40 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). As with Justice White, we can infer that 
Justice Marshall would have allowed similar actions under 
section 602 and its implementing regulations. 
 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun, determined: (1) private plaintiffs may seek 
injunctive, declaratory, or compensatory relief under Title 
VI; (2) intentional discrimination is a necessary element 
under section 601 of Title VI; and (3) regulations that 
incorporate a disparate impact standard are valid. See 463 
U.S. at 641-45, 103 S. Ct. at 3253-55 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.). 
Although Justice Stevens did not distinguish between a 
private right of action and an administrative remedy, he 
concluded by saying, "[A]lthough petitioners had to prove 
that the respondents' actions were motivated by an 
invidious intent in order to prove a violation of[Title VI], 
they only had to show that the respondents' actions were 
producing discriminatory effects in order to prove a 
violation of [the regulations]." Id. at 645, 103 S. Ct. at 
3255. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we can find an implicit approval 
by five Justices of the existence of a private right of action 
under discriminatory effect regulations implementing 
section 602 of Title VI. We hesitate, however, to hold that 
Guardians is dispositive of this appeal because the Court 
did not directly address the issue now before us. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We recognize that this inference requires a supposition, because 
sections 601 and 602 differ in substantial respects, as the discussion in 
section III.C.ii., infra, indicates. 
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CRCQL's second argument based on Guardians also has 
some merit. CRCQL argues that a private right of action 
exists because the Guardians Court did not dismiss the 
plaintiffs' action sua sponte for failure to state a claim. It is 
important to remember, however, that no party in 
Guardians raised, by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure or otherwise, the issue of whether a private 
right of action exists under section 602 and its 
implementing regulations. The Court did not have reason to 
speak directly to the issue, and based on the foregoing 
discussion, it is clear that it did not. Consequently, we find 
that CRCQL's second argument also lacks sufficient force to 
dispose of this appeal. 
 
ii. 
 
The Court offered some clarification of Guardians in its 
unanimous decision in Alexander, which involved section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.S 794, and 
its implementing regulations. With respect to Guardians, 
the Alexander Court stated: 
 
        In Guardians, we confronted the question whether 
       Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
       discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities in 
       programs receiving federal aid, reaches both intentional 
       and disparate-impact discrimination. No opinion 
       commanded a majority in Guardians, and Members of 
       the Court offered widely varying interpretations of Title 
       VI. Nonetheless, a two-pronged holding on the nature 
       of the discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in 
       that case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself 
       directly reached only instances of intentional 
       discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions 
       having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities 
       could be redressed through agency regulations 
       designed to implement the purposes of Title VI. In 
       essence, then, we held that Title VI had delegated to 
       the agencies in the first instance the complex 
       determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon 
       minorities constituted sufficiently significant social 
       problems, and were readily enough remediable, to 
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       warrant altering the practices of the federal grantees 
       that had produced those impacts. 
 
469 U.S. at 292-94, 105 S. Ct. at 716 (citation and 
footnotes omitted). The most plausible reading of this 
language is that it confirms that a private right of action 
exists under section 601 of Title VI and that the 
promulgation of discriminatory effect regulations is a valid 
exercise of agency authority under section 602. 
 
CRCQL argues that the Court recognized the existence of 
a private right of action in the following language from 
Alexander: 
 
        "Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioners' 
       blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only 
       intentional discrimination against the handicapped. 
       Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is 
       relevant to the interpretation of S 504, Guardians 
       suggests that the regulations implementing S 504, 
       upon which respondents in part rely, could make 
       actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case. 
 
469 U.S. at 294, 105 S. Ct. at 716.8 Stitching together 
CRCQL's arguments and those made by the Trial Lawyers 
for Public Justice ("TLPJ") and the Southern Poverty Law 
Center ("SPLC") as amici, the argument in favor of inferring 
the existence of a private right of action from Alexander 
proceeds as follows. The Alexander Court noted in the 
above-quoted language that, to the extent that Title VI 
jurisprudence is relevant to the Rehabilitation Act, 
Guardians "suggests" that a party can proceed with a 
disparate impact claim under section 504's implementing 
regulations. This suggestion obtains, the argument must 
go, because Guardians itself stands for the proposition that 
a party can proceed with a disparate impact claim under 
the regulations implementing section 602. Alexander, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The issue that the Alexander Court was addressing when it made 
these statements was whether discriminatory intent is required to 
establish a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 794, and its implementing regulations. The Court ultimately 
determined that some, but not all, disparate impact showings constitute 
a prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act. 469 U.S. at 292-99, 105 
S. Ct. at 715-19. 
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therefore, implicitly confirms that Guardians recognized the 
existence of a private right of action. 
 
While CRCQL's argument has some merit, we are not 
persuaded. The Court in Alexander spoke in the passive 
voice -- "could make actionable" -- and did not indicate 
whether Guardians stood for the proposition that a private 
plaintiff, or the relevant agency, could proceed under a 
disparate impact standard. CRCQL's argument requires the 
inference that because Alexander was a suit brought by 
private plaintiffs, and because Guardians was also brought 
by private plaintiffs, the Alexander Court must have been 
speaking of private plaintiffs when it used the passive voice. 
This inference from Guardians may be justified, but we find 
no direct authority in Alexander that either confirms or 
denies the existence of a private right of action. 
Consequently, we decline to hold that a private right of 
action exists based on Guardians and Alexander alone.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. PADEP argues that the Court's opinion in United States v. Fordice, 505 
U.S. 717, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992), indicates that no private right of 
action 
to enforce Title VI regulations exists. PADEP misconstrues Fordice. 
Fordice addressed Title VI in a single footnote, which stated in relevant 
part: 
 
        Private petitioners reiterate in this Court their assertion that 
the 
       state system also violates Title VI, citing a regulation to that 
statute 
       which requires States to "take affirmative action to overcome the 
       effects of prior discrimination." Our cases make clear, and the 
       parties do not disagree, that the reach of Title VI's protection 
       extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment. We thus treat 
       the issues in these cases as they are implicated under the 
       Constitution. 
 
Id. at 732 n.7, 112 S. Ct. at 2738 n.7 (citations omitted). Fordice did 
not 
indicate that private plaintiffs were barred from asserting a claim under 
the regulation quoted. Rather, the Court merely noted that the 
affirmative relief called for under the statute could not reach beyond 
that 
afforded by the Constitution itself. Hidden within the Court's statement 
may be an indication that implementing regulations, such as the EPA's, 
that incorporate a discriminatory effect standard are invalid, because 
they extend further than the Fourteenth Amendment. Guardians and 
Alexander, however, state that such regulations are valid. Moreover, we 
do not believe that the Court would overturn Guardians and Alexander 
in such an oblique manner. 
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B. 
 
Having determined that the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent is not dispositive, we look to our own precedent. 
The district court relied on our statements in Chowdhury 
for the conclusion that no private right of action exists. See 
944 F. Supp. at 417. CRCQL, and TLPJ and SPLC as amici, 
argue that reliance on Chowdhury is questionable because: 
(1) Chowdhury did not apply this Circuit's three-prong test 
for determining when it is appropriate to infer a private 
right of action to enforce regulations; and (2) Chowdhury 
was decided before Guardians. 
 
The sole question in Chowdhury was whether a private 
plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies under 
section 602 and its implementing regulations before 
bringing suit directly under section 601. In holding that a 
plaintiff need not do so, we reasoned that "an aggrieved 
individual may file a complaint with the funding agency but 
has no role in the investigation or adjudication, if any, of 
the complaint." 677 F.2d at 319 (footnotes omitted). 
Moreover, we stated that "[t]here is no provision for a 
remedy for the victim of the discrimination, such as 
injunctive relief or damages." Id. at 320 (footnote omitted). 
 
Chowdhury appears to decide that no private right of 
action exists under the regulations, and we readily 
understand why the district court reached this conclusion. 
We nevertheless disagree with that conclusion. Chowdhury 
does not hold that no private right of action exists under 
section 602 and its implementing regulations. It merely 
indicates that the regulations themselves do not expressly 
provide for a significant role for private parties, which is 
apparent on the face of the regulations. Chowdhury says 
nothing about the appropriateness of implying a private 
right of action. Section 602 and its implementing 
regulations were only relevant in Chowdhury to the extent 
that they, on their face, afforded private plaintiffs a 
peripheral role in administrative proceedings. The 
Chowdhury court took this peripheral role as an indication 
that private plaintiffs should not have to pursue their 
claims under the regulations before initiating a direct 
action pursuant to their rights under section 601. The 
district court misapplied our statements in Chowdhury. 
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Looking to our other precedent, CRCQL and amici cite 
our decision in Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 
F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990), a post-Guardians opinion, in 
support of the existence of a private right of action. Pfeiffer 
involved a suit by a high school student alleging gender 
discrimination in her dismissal from the local chapter of the 
National Honor Society. The plaintiff asserted claims under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and its 
implementing regulations, as well as other federal and state 
statutes. Pfeiffer is only significant to this appeal because 
we made therein the following statements concerning 
Guardians: 
 
        In Guardians, the "threshold issue before the Court 
       [was] whether . . . private plaintiffs . . . need to prove 
       discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI 
       . . . and administrative implementing regulations 
       promulgated thereunder." A majority of the Court 
       agreed that a violation of the statute itself requires 
       proof of discriminatory intent. A different majority 
       seemed to suggest that proof of discriminatory effect 
       suffices to establish liability when suit is brought to 
       enforce the regulations rather than the statute itself. 
 
917 F.2d at 788 (quoting Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584, 103 
S. Ct. at 3223) (citations omitted). 
 
It is of course informative to read an interpretation of 
Guardians by a prior panel. The interpretation, however, 
is dicta and not binding on this panel. Pfeiffer concerned 
a claim of intentional gender discrimination, not 
discriminatory effect. See id. ("This is, therefore, not a case 
of discriminatory effect, but one of discriminatory 
intention."). The issue before the court was whether the 
district court's finding that school authorities dismissed the 
plaintiff from the National Honor Society because of 
premarital sex and not gender discrimination was clearly 
erroneous. See id. at 780. The court had no reason to 
consider the status of a private right of action under section 
602 and its implementing regulations. In addition, the 
above-quoted language from Pfeiffer, like the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Alexander, is in the passive voice-- 
"when suit is brought"-- and fails to specify who may bring 
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suit to enforce the regulations. Although Pfeiffer is 
instructive, we find it insufficient to dispose of this appeal. 
 
C. 
 
Since our own precedent does not resolve the matter, we 
must now determine whether to imply a private right of 
action. This court has established a three-prong test for 
determining when it is appropriate to imply private rights of 
action to enforce regulations. The test requires a court to 
inquire: "(1) `whether the agency rule is properly within the 
scope of the enabling statute'; (2) `whether the statute 
under which the rule was promulgated properly permits the 
implication of a private right of action'; and (3)`whether 
implying a private right of action will further the purpose of 
the enabling statute.' " Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 
987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Angelastro v. Prudential- 
Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985)). We 
discuss each prong in turn. 
 
i. 
 
There is no question that the EPA's discriminatory effect 
regulation satisfies the first prong. The Supreme Court's 
unanimous opinion in Alexander makes clear that "actions 
having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [can] 
be redressed through agency regulations designed to 
implement the purposes of Title VI." 469 U.S. at 293, 105 
S. Ct. at 716 (footnote omitted). 
 
ii. 
 
The second and third prongs are the crux of this case. In 
addressing the second, a court will consider the factors set 
out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 
S. Ct. 2080 (1975), and its progeny. See Angelastro, 764 
F.2d at 947. The factors relevant here are: (1) whether there 
is "any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, 
either to create such a remedy or to deny one"; and (2) 
whether it is "consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
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plaintiff." Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S. Ct. at 2088 (citations 
omitted).10 
 
The United States, as amicus, contends that the 
implication of a private right of action is consistent with 
legislative intent because Congress acknowledged the 
existence of the right when it amended Title VI. The 
purpose of the amendment was to broaden the scope of 
coverage of Title VI in response to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S. 
Ct. 1211 (1984), where the Court narrowly construed the 
terms "program or activity."11 The United States cites 
various items of legislative history which it claims indicates 
an "understanding . . . [of] the existence of the 
discriminatory effects regulations and the fact that they 
could be enforced in federal court by private parties." 
Amicus Br. at 21. 
 
First, the United States relies on a House Report on an 
early version of the relevant bill, which states that the 
"private right of action which allows a private individual or 
entity to sue to enforce Title IX would continue to provide 
the vehicle to test [certain] regulations in Title IX and their 
expanded meaning to their outermost limits." H.R. REP. NO. 
963, Pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1986).12 Second, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The other Cort factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is "one of the 
class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,-- that is, does 
the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff "; and (2) 
whether the cause of action is "one traditionally relegated to state law, 
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be 
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law." 422 
U.S. at 78, 95 S. Ct. at 2088 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Clearly, CRCQL satisfies the first. The second is irrelevant 
because Title VI is federal law. 
 
11. Section 601 of Title VI prohibits any "program or activity" receiving 
Federal funds from discriminating on various grounds. See 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000d. 
 
12. Courts have regarded Title IX and Title VI jurisprudence as, more or 
less, interchangeable. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
694-96, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1956-57 (1979) ("Title IX was patterned after 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Except for the substitution of 
the 
word `sex' in Title IX to replace the words `race, color, or national 
origin' 
in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the 
benefited class. . . . The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it 
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the 
preceding eight years." (footnotes omitted)). 
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United States relies on several legislators' comments in the 
Congressional Record, where the legislators appear to 
recognize the existence of a private right of action.13 Third, 
the United States also relies on the following compilations 
of testimony at congressional hearings: Civil Rights Act of 
1984: Hearings on S. 2568 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 23-24, 153-54, 200 (1984); Civil Rights Restoration 
Act of 1985: Joint Hearings on H.R. 700 Before the House 
Comm. on Educ. & Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil & 
Const. Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 734, 1095, 1099 (1985). The first 
compilation contains, inter alia, a memorandum by the 
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") which states 
OMB's opinion that "every licensed attorney would be 
empowered to file suit to enforce the `effects test' 
regulations of agencies, challenging practices in every 
aspect of every institution that receives any Federal 
assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 2568 
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 527 (1984). 
 
PADEP presents two responses. First, PADEP emphasizes 
that the purpose of the amendment of Title VI was to 
address the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City, not to 
confirm or announce the existence of a private right of 
action. Second, PADEP reminds the court that many of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The United States quotes the following observations of Senator 
Hatch: 
 
       The failure to provide a particular share of contract opportunities 
to 
       minority-owned businesses, for example, could lead Federal agencies 
       to undertake enforcement action asserting that the failure to 
provide 
       more contracts to minority-owned firms, standing alone, is 
       discriminatory under agency disparate impact regulations 
       implementing Title VI. . . . Of course, advocacy groups will be 
able 
       to bring private lawsuits making the same allegations before 
federal 
       judges. 
 
134 CONG. REC. 4,257 (1988). The United States also quotes a portion of 
the following statement by Representative Fields: "If a greater percentage 
of minority than white students fail a bar exam or a medical exam . . . 
will a State be subject to private lawsuits because the tests have a 
disproportionate impact on minorities[.]" 130 CONG. REC. 18,880 (1984). 
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above-cited comments may only reflect the views of 
individual members of Congress. PADEP does not, however, 
cite to any statements in the Congressional Record or 
elsewhere that would undermine those cited by the United 
States. We therefore find that there is some indication in 
the legislative history, here uncontroverted, of an intent to 
create a private right of action, in satisfaction of the Cort 
factors. 
 
This finding, however, does not end our inquiry. The Cort 
factors also require a court to determine whether it is 
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff[.]" 422 U.S. 
at 78, 95 S. Ct. at 2088. Relevant to this inquiry is PADEP's 
argument that section 602 and the regulations situate the 
EPA as, in essence, a gatekeeper to enforcement, and that 
the implication of a private right of action would be 
inconsistent with this legislative scheme. According to 
PADEP, section 602 imposes what PADEP terms as "strict 
preconditions" on the use of that section's enforcement 
apparatus.14 Specifically, section 602 provides: 
 
       [N]o such action shall be taken until the department or 
       agency concerned has advised the appropriate person 
       or persons of the failure to comply with the 
       requirement and has determined that compliance 
       cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of 
       any action terminating, or refusing to grant or 
       continue, assistance because of failure to comply with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Section 602 provides for the following enforcement apparatus: 
 
       Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section 
       may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to 
       continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient 
       as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after 
       opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such 
       requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to 
the 
       particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as 
to 
       whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its 
       effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such 
       noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means 
       authorized by law . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1. 
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       a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the 
       head of the Federal department or agency shall file 
       with the committees of the House and Senate having 
       legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity 
       involved a full written report of the circumstances and 
       the grounds for such action. No such action shall 
       become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the 
       filing of such report. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1. EPA enforcement action can occur 
only after the agency has negotiated these procedural 
requirements. Should we find that it is appropriate to imply 
a private right of action, PADEP emphasizes that private 
plaintiffs would not have to negotiate these requirements. 
 
In addition, PADEP emphasizes that the EPA's 
regulations expressly provide private parties with an 
administrative mechanism through which they can raise 
allegations of unintentional discrimination. See 40 C.F.R. 
SS 7.120-7.130. These regulations provide, in relevant part: 
 
       A person who believes that he or she or a specific class 
       of persons has been discriminated against in violation 
       of this Part may file a complaint. The complaint may be 
       filed by an authorized representative. A complaint 
       alleging employment discrimination must identify at 
       least one individual aggrieved by such discrimination. 
       Complaints solely alleging employment discrimination 
       against an individual on the basis of race, color, 
       national origin, sex or religion shall be processed under 
       the procedures for complaints of employment 
       discrimination filed against recipients of federal 
       assistance. Complainants are encouraged but not 
       required to make use of any grievance procedure 
       established under S 7.90 before filing a complaint. 
       Filing a complaint through a grievance procedure does 
       not extend the 180 day calendar requirement of 
       paragraph (b)(2) of this section. 
 
40 C.F.R. S 7.120(a) (citation omitted). In PADEP's 
estimation, section 602 and the regulations situate the EPA 
as a gatekeeper to enforcement, with private parties 
submitting their allegations to the agency and its 
discretion. PADEP contends that a private right of action is 
inconsistent with this legislative scheme. 
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We recognize that PADEP's argument has some force. 
There is, however, a more convincing counter-argument. 
The procedural requirements in section 602 provide a fund 
recipient with a form of notice that the agency has begun 
an investigation which may culminate in the termination of 
its funding. We note that a private lawsuit also affords a 
fund recipient similar notice. If the purpose of the 
requirements is to provide bare notice, private lawsuits are 
consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI. 
Furthermore, unlike the EPA, private plaintiffs do not have 
the authority to terminate funding.15 As a result, the 
purpose that the requirements serve is not as significant in 
private lawsuits, where the potential remedy does not 
include the result (i.e., termination of funding) at which 
Congress directed the requirements. Stated differently, the 
requirements were designed to cushion the blow of a result 
that private plaintiffs cannot effectuate. Based on the 
foregoing, we find that the implication of a private right of 
action would be consistent with the legislative scheme of 
Title VI. 
 
In sum, we find that there is some indication in the 
legislative history of an intent to create a private right of 
action and that the implication of a private right of action 
would be consistent with the legislative scheme of Title VI, 
in accordance with the relevant Cort factors. Accordingly, 
we find that " `the statute under which the rule was 
promulgated properly permits the implication of a private 
right of action,' " Polaroid Corp., 862 F.2d at 994 (quoting 
Angelastro, 764 F.2d at 947), and that the second prong of 
the test is satisfied. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. While it is well established that private plaintiffs do not have the 
authority to compel a termination of funding, we make no determination 
at this time as to what alternative remedies offer appropriate relief for 
plaintiffs who prevail in actions to enforce agency regulations brought 
pursuant to section 602. See NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 
1247, 1254 n.27 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 711-17, 
99 S. Ct. at 1965-68 (discussing the legislative history of Title VI as it 
relates to the implication of a private remedy for victims of 
discrimination). Rather, should relief prove warranted in this case, we 
leave the determination of the appropriate remedy to the district court in 
the first instance. 
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iii. 
 
The third prong of the test requires the court to inquire 
" `whether implying a private right of action will further the 
purpose of the enabling statute.' " Id. (quoting Angelastro, 
764 F.2d at 947). The United States contends that this 
prong is satisfied because the implication of a private right 
of action under section 602 and the regulations will further 
the dual purposes of Title VI, which are to: (1) combat 
discrimination by entities who receive federal funds; and (2) 
provide citizens with effective protection against 
discrimination. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704, 99 S. Ct. at 
1961. A private right of action will further these purposes, 
the argument goes, because it will deputize private 
attorneys general who will enforce section 602 and its 
implementing regulations. The United States, moreover, 
points out that the EPA itself lacks sufficient resources to 
achieve adequate enforcement. 
 
We agree with the United States that, to the extent that 
a private right of action will increase enforcement, the 
implication of that right will further the dual purposes of 
Title VI. Consequently, we find that the third prong of the 
test is also satisfied. 
 
iv. 
 
Lastly, although no other court of appeals has rendered 
a holding on the precise issue before this court, we note 
that the decisions of other courts of appeals indicate 
support for our reasoning. See, e.g., Latinos Unidos de 
Chelsea v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 
785 n.20 (1st Cir. 1986) ("Under the statute itself, plaintiffs 
must make a showing of discriminatory intent; under the 
regulations, plaintiffs simply must show a discriminatory 
impact." (citation omitted)); New York Urban League, Inc. v. 
New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Courts 
considering claims under analogous Title VI regulations 
have looked to Title VII disparate impact cases for 
guidance. A plaintiff alleging a violation of the DOT 
regulations must make a prima facie showing that the 
alleged conduct has a disparate impact." (citations 
omitted)); Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard, 781 F.2d 
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456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Thus a Title VI action can 
now be maintained in either the guise of a disparate 
treatment case, where proof of discriminatory motive is 
critical, or in the guise of a disparate impact case, involving 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their 
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more 
harshly on one group than another. In this latter type of 
case, proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary." 
(citation omitted)); Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, Tenn., 99 
F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) ("A plaintiff may 
pursue a claim under a disparate impact theory as well. 
However, a disparate impact theory is not applicable in the 
case at hand." (citation omitted)); David K. v. Lane, 839 
F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is clear that plaintiffs 
may maintain a private cause of action to enforce the 
regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act. Moreover, plaintiffs need not show intentional 
discriminatory conduct to prevail on a claim brought under 
these administrative regulations. Evidence of a 
discriminatory effect is sufficient." (citation omitted)); 
Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1044- 
45 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Although the voting of the Justices may 
be difficult for the reader to discern at first, a majority of 
the Court in Guardians Association concluded that a 
discriminatory-impact claim could be maintained under 
those regulations, although not under the statute." 
(citations omitted)); Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 
969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[P]roof of discriminatory effect 
suffices to establish liability when the suit is brought to 
enforce regulations issued pursuant to the statute rather 
than the statute itself." (footnote omitted)); Villanueva v. 
Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although Title 
VI itself proscribes only intentional discrimination, certain 
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit 
actions that have a disparate impact on groups protected 
by the act, even in the absence of discriminatory intent." 
(citation omitted)); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 
997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) ("While Title VI itself, 
like the Fourteenth Amendment, bars only intentional 
discrimination, the regulations promulgated pursuant to 
Title VI may validly proscribe actions having a disparate 
impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those 
 
                                23 
  
actions are not intentionally discriminatory." (citations 
omitted)); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) ("There is no 
doubt that the plaintiffs predicated this cause of action on 
the regulations. As a result, the district court correctly 
applied disparate impact analyses to their Title VI claims." 
(footnote omitted)). 
 
v. 
 
In conclusion, the district court misapplied our decision 
in Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317 
(3d Cir. 1982). Chowdhury did not apply this court's three- 
prong test for determining when it is appropriate to imply 
a private right of action to enforce regulations and was 
decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Guardians. 
Applying that three-prong test, we hold that private 
plaintiffs may maintain an action under discriminatory 
effect regulations promulgated by federal administrative 
agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, we will reverse and remand 
for further proceedings, including a consideration of the 
remaining grounds for dismissal contained in defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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